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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE AS TO
LIABILITY INSURANCE IN
NEGLIGENCE CASES
By Edward L. Wood of the Denver Bar
OST members of the bar have had some experience in
negligence cases and are famiiiar with the general
rule which provides that evidence of insurance shall
be inadmissible. The rule is, however, subject to a number
of qualifications and exceptions which are not so well known
to the average lawyer. The general principles have become
fairly well established in a veritable host of reported cases,
although there is considerable conflict between the rules
adopted in various jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of
Colorado has passed upon several phases of the problem but
the law has by no means been fully settled in this State. In
spite of the vast amount of litigation upon the subject, a general dissatisfaction still exists in many quarters as to the present state of the law. This is particularly true among insurance
men who have frequently seen the effect of a blind and unreasoning prejudice against insurance companies in these
cases. It is a blind prejudice because the public often fails to
realize that large verdicts are paid by an increase in insurance
premiums. When. that fact has become thoroughly assimilated,
and when automobile liability insurance is carried by the great
majority of citizens eligible for jury service, the problem now
under discussion will lose its importance. The questions are
very real today, however, and there are pronounced abuses
which can, and should be, corrected.
The Courts commonly base the rule excluding evidence
of liability insurance, upon the technical ground that such
evidence is irrelevant and immaterial and tends to confuse the
issues. The true basis for the rule of exclusion is, however,
the extremely prejudicial character of such testimony. Some
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courts have been so greatly impressed with the evil effects of
testimony of insurance that the rule of exclusion has been
made paramount to all of the ordinary rules of evidence and
of trial procedure. The slightest infraction of the rule, even
though innocent, has necessitated a new trial. It may be of
interest to note some of the comments which have been made
by the Courts in discussing the effect of such testimony.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has announced (Holman v. Cole, 242 Mich. 402, 218 N. W. 795) that it would
take judicial notice that in a case where the jurors obtain information that the damages as fixed by them will be paid by
an Insurance Company, the amount thereof is greatly
enhanced.
A Texas Court (Beazley v. McEver, 238 S. W. 949) said
that no circumstance is more surely calculated to cause a
jury to render a verdict against a defendant without regard
to the sufficiency of the evidence, than proof that the person
against whom such verdict is sought, is amply protected by
indemnity insurance.
Principally because of the resulting prejudice, the authorities are practically unanimous in holding that a plaintiff
will not be permitted to show, as an. independent fact, that
the defendant is insured against the liability which the plaintiff seeks to establish. Nebraska is the only jurisdiction which
has adopted a contrary rule. In Jessup v. Davis, 115 Neb. 1,
211 N. W. 190, the Supreme Court of Nebraska pronounced
the rule that "Where a plaintiff in a personal injury action
seeks by appropriate interrogatories on the cross examination
to discover whether the defendant is indemnified from loss by
an insurance company, it is error for the Court to sustain an
objection to interrogatories which tend to develop the fact on
that question." The decision was based upon public policy,
the Court seeming to feel -that any other rule would promote
intolerable evils. The Court was somewhat caustic in its condemnation of insurance practices, as will be seen in the following passage taken from this opinion:
"Indeed, the entire theory of legal procedure, outlined in these contracts for liability insurance contemplates a proceeding carried on secretly, by
a real, though unknown, party in interest, making use of concealment and
deception. Its essential nature is therefore incompatible with an 'open Court'
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and judgments publicly and openly arrived at. To compel and permit such
proceeding is to countenance and participate in what is tantamount to a fraud."

It is comforting to insurance attorneys to know that three
members of the Nebraska Supreme Court dissented from the
opinion. of the Court in that case, and that no other Court in
the land has adopted such an extreme and critical view of
the standard indemnity contract issued by insurance companies
or of the practice of such companies in defending negligence
cases.
The Nebraska Court in the same case advances also the
following interesting theory:
"Are we not thus driven to conclude that when such insurance is
arranged for, the feeling of liability, as well as responsibility, on the part of
the individual insured is lessened, and that thereby recklessness or lack of
ordinary care is bred, rather than ordinary care held in statu quo or greater
care promoted? Should not such question be one for the jury or court
trying the case as any other fact submitted for consideration, not as a question of intent on the part of the party causing the claimed injury, but as such
fact may bear on the question of his care or lack of care or negligence in
the particular case?"

It seems clear enough to all other courts that have discussed the suggestion of the Nebraska Court, that the true
issue is whether the defendant was negligent on the occasion
in question, not whether he was possessed of a tendency to be
careless because of his insurance protection.
The general rule excluding evidence of insurance is, of
course, applied in all stages of the trial-in the selection of
the jury, in the direct, cross and redirect examination of the
parties, and of witnesses, and in the arguments of counsel to
the jury.
It should here be noted that the converse of the general
rule above stated has also been almost universally adopted and
a defendant may not show that he is uninsured. The unequal
manner in which these two rules operate will be obvious,
although evidence, or some suggestion, of insurance may creep
into the case apparently without fault of the plaintiff or his
counsel, under such circumstances that a new trial will not
be granted, it is extremely difficult to conceive of the situation where a defendant may with an equal show of innocence,
apprise the jury that he carries no insurance. It frequently
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happens that an uninsured defendant is unjustly penalized as
a result of "insurance questions" propounded to the jury on
voir dire. That unfortunate situation could easily be prevented by a few simple changes in our system of procedure.
The majority of the courts hold that the rule excluding
evidence of liability insurance is subject to the ordinary rules
of evidence, and also to the usual rules of practice governing
the examination of witnesses. Accordingly, evidence of insurance is deemed admissible under the following circumstances: (a)
When the evidence is relevant to some material issue properly in the case; (b) When such evidence
is disclosed in developing interest, bias, or motive on the part
of witnesses; (c) When such evidence is an integral part
of a conversation which constitutes an admission of liability
by the defendant.
In States where laws relating to workmen's compensation
have not been adopted, evidence of insurance is frequently
admissible in damage actions between Master and Servant,
where such relationship is in issue. Evidence that the Defendant carries indemnity insurance upon his employees, including the plaintiff, would be of strong probative value,
going to show that plaintiff was in fact the employee of defendant. The evidence of insurance is therefore admitted
upon the theory that evidence is admissible if it tends to prove
one issue, even though it is not admissible to prove another
issue, and is prejudicial upon such latter issue.
In automobile damage cases, when it becomes a material
issue for the plaintiff to prove that the automobile causing the
injury, was owned by defendant, many courts admit evidence
that the defendant made a report to a casualty company wherein he admitted ownership of the automobile. Upon the same
issue, it has been held competent for the plaintiff merely to
show that liability insurance had been taken out by defendant
upon the automobile in question.
It will be clear from what has been stated, that evidence of insurance will not, under the majority rule, be admitted as bearing upon the issue of negligence. As a logical
sequence to that principle, it is well established that, even
though the fact of insurance be shown as relevant to some
other issue, it is error for the trial court to instruct the jury
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that they may consider whether or not the fact that defendant
was insured made him careless or reckless or whether or not
a man having insurance against loss will be as careful as if
he had no insurance.
The Colorado Supreme Court has not ruled upon the
admissibility of evidence of insurance when relevant to material issues in the case, such as suggested above, but it seems
likely, in view of the decisions of our Court generally upon
the subject, that, when the question is presented, it will follow
the majority rule.
Evidence of insurance is frequently placed before the
jury under the well established doctrine that facts tending to
show interest, bias or motive on the part of a witness may be
elicited on cross examination, although such examination may
necessarily disclose that the defendant is protected by insurance. This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado in The Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining Co. vs.
Firstbrook, 36 Colo. 498. In that case, the defendant produced a witness to prove the execution of a release by the
plaintiff, and Counsel for plaintiff brought out on cross examination that the witness, in taking the release, acted for an
insurance company. The Court said:
"It appears that he (the witness) was not employed by the defendant
to secure this release, but in doing so was acting as the agent of the insurance
company. There was a conflict in the testimony with respect to the circumstances under which this release was obtained and it was competent for
the plaintiff to bring to the attention of the jury the interest which the witness, by virtue of his relation to the insurance company, had in securing the
release, as well as in the result of the action. Matters brought out on cross
examination which are legitimate for the purpose of enabling the jury to
determine the credibility of a witness, are not objectionable, although they
may relate to questions not in issue in the case."

Under this principle, it would be quite permissible in
order to show interest or bias of a physician, or any other witness offered by defendant to minimize the plaintiff's damages,
to elicit on cross examination that such witness was in the
service and pay of an insurance company. So also may it be
shown upon cross examination of a witness for the defendant,
who has given evidence of a written statement procured from
the plaintiff, that the witness was a claim agent for an in-
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surance company which carried the defendant's liability insurance, and that he was visiting the plaintiff in that capacity
when he took the statement. Under an extension of the same
rule, when a plaintiff was placed upon the witness stand by
the defendant in order to identify a statement signed by the
plaintiff, which it was claimed contradicted his testimony at
the trial, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that it was not
error for the plaintiff to show that the statement was actually
prepared by an Adjuster for an insurance company-by one
interested in the result of the case. (Arizona Cotton Oil Co.
v. Thompson, 30 Ariz. 204, 245 Pac. 673). This doctrine
makes it entirely unsafe for the defendant's attorney (who
actually represents an insurance company) to take the stand
in order to give proof of conflicting statements previously
made by the plaintiff or his witnesses at other times.
It has been held, oddly enough, that although a plaintiff
may show that a witness was sent by an insurance company to
examine the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, and so might be
biased in favor of his employer, the plaintiff may not even
intimate to the jury that the insurance company was the real
defendant. (Mitchell v. Heintzman, 23 Ont. Week. Rep.
763).
The rule which is probably subjected to more abuse than
any of the other rules which admit evidence of insurance
under particular circumstances, is the one providing that evidence showing an admission of liability by the Defendant may
properly be admitted, although it is developed that in making
the admission the Defendant stated that he carried liability
insurance. Practically all courts are agreed that the mere
voluntary statement of a party after an accident that he is
insured, does not in itself constitute an admission, and is not
admissible in the absence of other statements or circumstances
tending to establish an admission of liability. The statement
as to insurance is, however, brought out under the guise of
offering a conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant constituting an admission of liability, and although the
conversation may be stricken out, when its insufficiency appears, the plaintiff's purpose has been successfully accomplished.
Under the doctrine concerning admissions, reports made
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by a defendant to his insurer containing statements of fact
material and relevant to matters in controversy, have been
held competent. In Hill vs. Jackson, 272 S. W. 105, which
was a malpractice case where the defendant denied injuring
the plaintiff, a Missouri Court held that a report of any kind
to the insurance company, prior to threat of suit, would be
competent as bearing on the issue as to whether he did injure
the plaintiff. While the Court felt that plaintiff should not
be permitted to indulge in a fishing expedition before the jury
as to whether or not the defendant had made a report to his
insurance company the court conceded the right of plaintiff's
counsel to question the defendant outside of the presence of
the jury, and to make use before the jury of such relevant information as might be uncovered. This doctrine seems neither
wise nor just and has not been widely adopted. The communications between a defendant and his insurer are largely
of a confidential character, and would better be considered
privileged. In actual practice today, accident investigations
are frequently made directly from the office of the company
attorney. These communications are probably privileged, as
being between attorney and client. The way is thus possibly
open to defeat the rule which destroys the private character
of the company correspondence. It would seem better sense
to adopt one rule which would not distinguish between the
attorney and the claim agent and which would encourage a
complete and truthful statement of the facts from the nominal
defendant to the party who holds the purse strings.
Passing now from the examination of witnesses to the
arguments of counsel it may be stated as a general rule that
statements by counsel inferring that the defendant carries
liability insurance, are considered a ground for new trial,
with the exception of those instances where the fact of insurance is properly in evidence. The Supreme Court of Colorado has expressed itself strongly upon this point in Coe v.
Van Why, 33 Colo. 315. In that case, one of plaintiff's counsel in his opening argument to the jury stated: "It is a matter
of common knowledge that employers and mining companies
in this district protect themselves against liability on account
of accidents by taking out insurance in insurance companies
against such liability." The trial court immediately instructed
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the jury that these remarks must not be considered by them
for any purpose, but that the liability, if any, of defendants,
depended, not upon any custom or habit of mining companies,
but upon the facts proven in the case. The judgment which
was obtained by the plaintiff below was reversed by the
Supreme Court. The following passage from the opinion
will bear repetition:
"It is admitted that there was no evidence in the case upon which to
base the statement. That it was improper is conceded by counsel who made
it, but it is said that no prejudice resulted to defendants because the court
immediately cautioned the jury to disregard it. We are unable to agree with
this specious kind of argument. In Tanner v. Harper, 32 Colo. 156, a
personal injury case in which one of the learned counsel for plaintiff here was
an attorney, plaintiff's counsel, in his opening statement, said that an insurance company was the real party defendant in interest, and, upon their
voir dire, over the objection of defendants, he was permitted to ask each
juror whether he was acquainted with the insurance company in question or
had been in its employ. It was argued there that plaintiff was entitled to
know if any of the panel of jurors was interested in the insurance company
so as to exclude them from the jury that was to try the case. Such excuse
cannot be given here, and we did not hold it valid there; but as there were
no close questions of fact in the Tanner case for the determination of the
jury, it affirmatively appeared that the defendants were not prejudiced by
the alleged errors. But here, as we have seen, the jury had been selected
when the comment was made. There were several closely contested questions
of fact, and there had been one mistrial, and it may be that the jurors were
largely influenced in returning the verdict against defendants because this
improper statement of counsel convinced them that some insurance corporation, and not the defendants, would respond for any damages that might be
awarded. We are satisfied that the unfavorable impression on the minds of
the jury was not removed by the direction of the Court to disregard the
statement. Counsel knew when he made it that it was improper and reprehensible, and it is fair to presume that he would not have done so, had he not
supposed that some advantage to his client would thereby be gained. In such
cases counsel who thus seeks to obtain that result takes upon himself the
risk of losing what he hopes to secure."

This decision, it will be seen, places some importance
upon the stage of the proceeding at which the improper comments are made. The offense is considered more serious after
the selection of the jury than before.
Although it is considered highly improper for counsel
to state or to suggest to the jurors, even prior to their selection,
that the defendant is insured, the widest scope is usually
allowed to counsel in their interrogation of the jurors upon
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their voir dire examination. It is almost universal practice
in cases where the defendant is insured, for plaintiff's counsel
to question the jurors upon their relationship to the interested
insurance company, or its officers or local agents. This practice has of course been challenged upon the ground that such
questions lead the jury to believe that the defendant is protected by insurance, and that the questions actually accomplish n-o legitimate purpose. In a Texas case, (Tarbutton v.
Ambriz, 282 S. W. 891) it is said that whether or not a juror
or a member of his family is connected with, or has any interest in, a liability insurance company, has no legitimate
bearing on the issue involved, for, if the juror should be employed or have an interest in such company, he would not
know whether defendant was insured in that or any other insurance company, and it could not affect his verdict. This
statement is not, however, strictly true in all cases, and the vast
majority of the courts have felt that the protection of the defendant from possible adverse inferences does not justify so
close a restriction upon the plaintiff's means of testing, within
reasonable limits, and in good faith, the qualifications of
proposed jurors.
In many decisions it has been held that counsel for plaintiff may be permitted to ask the jurors, either individually or
collectively, upon their voir dire, whether they are engaged
in the insurance business, or have any connections of any kind
with any casualty or indemnity insurance companies, either
as stockholder, agent or otherwise. In other decisions it is
held that the jurors may be questioned concerning their relationship to a specified insurance company. Some courts permit the interrogatory to be made in either form, while some
courts approve only the general form, and some only the
specific.
In Colorado, several cases have recognized the right to
inquire concerning the relationship of jurors with a specified
company, but there have been no cases upon the right to inquire concerning the connection with insurance companies
generally. The following cases contain some discussion of
the subject.
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Vindicator Company vs. Firstbrook, 36 C. 498.
Cripple Creek Min. Co. vs. Bradbout, 37 C. 423.
Cripple Creek Min. Co. vs. Estet, 37 C. 431.
Independence Coffee and Spice Co. vs. Kalkman, 61 C. 98.
Tatarsky vs. Smith, 78 C. 491.
Bolles vs. Kinton, 83 C. 147.

Although it is possibly true that inquiries directed to the
particular company which has insured the defendant is a more
logical and effective method of determining the qualifications
of the jurors in the particular case on trial, it seems doubtful
that the Supreme Court of Colorado would consider the asking of questions concerning the relationship of the juror to
any insurance company, to be reversible error. This would
be particularly true where counsel for defendant refused to
divulge the name of the insurer. Under such circumstances,
it would probably be good practice, to inquire, in the absence
of the jury, whether any liability insurance company is connected with the case. If the name is divulged by counsel for
defendant, the interrogatories could be directed to the particular company. If not, counsel would be justified in making general interrogations.
It is probably unnecessary to state that it is usually held
error for plaintiff's counsel to propound the usual insurance
questions, without knowing that the defendant is insured.
Where there is in fact no insurance, it' should not in justice be
held error for the defendant to show the true fact when counsel for plaintiff has mentioned insurance in the voir dire examination. There seem to be no cases upon that particular point
although the courts have frequently said that there must be a
basis for the insurance questions on voir dire. Upon this point,
attention is called to the following passage taken from the
opinion in Tatarsky vs. Smith, 78 Colo. 491, 495;
"In Independence Coffee and Spice Co. vs. Kalkman, 61 Colo. 98,
we held that a plaintiff has the right to inquire if any member of the panel

has an interest in the corporation which has or is supposed to have, indemnified the defendant against the liability asserted . . . "

Although the right of plaintiff's counsel to question the jurors
concerning their insurance connections, is, in most cases, conditioned upon good faith and proper motive, it is doubtful
whether proper motive is any longer a condition to the right
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in Colorado. In Bolles vs. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, the Court
said at page 153:
"The plaintiff's counsel was permitted to ask the jury on voir dire
whether any of them were interesfed in a certain insurance company. This
was proper. The plaintiff had a right to ascertain the fact as to their
interest. True, counsel may have had a desire to let the jury know that
defendants carried liability insurance, but we do not see how he or the
Court could have treated the matter more fairly. All argument was in
chambers and the court restricted the examination on this point to the one
simple question."

In the earlier case of Vindicator Company vs. Firstbrook,
36 Colo.498, it was expressly held that such voir dire questions
might be propounded provided it appeared that they were
pertinent, and made in good faith, and for the purpose of
excluding from the panel partial or prejudiced persons. Insurance counsel have unsuccessfully attempted to utilize this
qualification by submitting affidavits before trial that none of
the jurors on the panel were in the slightest degree interested
in or connected with the insurance company. The trial courts
have nevertheless granted to counsel the right to propound
such questions to the jurors, thus effectively nullifying the
former condition of proper motive. It is scarcely to be
doubted that if the general rule excluding evidence of insurance is a salutary rule, the present practice regarding the voir
dire examination of jurors, is unsound and works great injustice, even admitting the unquestioned right of the plaintiff
to test the qualifications of the jurors. Other methods of procedure have been suggested which effectively prevent any
prejudice to the defendanit and at the same time fully protect
the rights of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a four to three decision
in Pavilonis vs. Valentine, 165 N. E. 730 sustained questions
as to insurance connection on the voir dire examination. One
of the dissenting judges, Marshall, C. J. suggested two methods of prevention that are worthy of close consideration.
(1) "Let the judge conduct the examination on this
point, after first stating that he has no knowledge whether or
not the defendant is insured, and that they (the jurors) must
assume that he is not insured."
(2) "Let a questionnaire be submitted to each juror
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when the summons is served on him, making minute inquiry as
to his connection with or relation to automobile liability insurance, the answers to be placed on file in the Clerk's office
and to be available at all times to counsel."
Referring to the first suggested method above, it would
seem more proper for the Court to state that "he has no
knowledge whether or not either the plaintiff or defendant is
insured." Thus, attention would not be directed to either
party.
Another method which is practiced generally in Vermont,
requires the presiding judge or the judge who organizes the
juries, at the first day of the week or term, or other period
when the veniremen are called, to inquire of each of them
minutely as to their interest in, or connection with any insurance company. A note is made showing in detail the name
of the company with which he is connected or in which he is
interested, and the information contained thereon is passed
on to all trial lawyers by memorandum on the printed list of
jurors. From that time on during the term of service of such
jurors no other questions are permitted.
It is felt that in order to reconcile the respective rights of
plaintiff and defendant in these cases, the Colorado courts
might well adopt one, or a combination, of the remedies suggested above.
Every trial court well knows how many times evidence
of insurance is improperly brought into a case. It is unfortunately true that counsel, when representing a plaintiff,
are often lax in the performance of their unquestioned duty
to keep such improper influence from the jury.
In Frohm vs. Siegel-Cooper Co., 116 N. Y. S. 90, a New
York court said: "The record presents a very flagrant instance of a practice on the part of plaintiff's counsel at trial
which is unhappily becoming too common in accident cases,
and which has frequently been characterized by this Court
and the Court of Appeals as reprehensible."
The Supreme Court of Carolina said in Horsford vs.
Carolina Glass Co., 92 S. C. 236, 75 S. E. 533:
"One of the most manifest and pressing duties, not only of courts, but
of lawyers, is to prevent influences of this kind from finding their way into
the administration of justice. In the discharge of this duty, the entire corn-
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monwealth is deeply concerned, for the use in evidence and argument of
such influences produces injustice and waste of the time and labor of courts
and jurors at great public cost."

It has proved most difficult to find a satisfactory remedy
when such error occurs. Only two possibilities are open-one
to instruct the jury to disregard such testimony-the second to
grant a new trial. Although some courts seem to require a
new trial at the mere mention of liability insurance, such
doctrine is neither just nor practicable, for the power is thus
placed with the defendant to prevent the entry of judgment,
and the burden of the courts is increased to an intolerable
degree. More and more the courts are tending to make good
faith of the plaintiff and his counsel, the test of the form of
relief to be granted to the defendant. If the error is wilful,
a new trial will be granted. If not, the court often contents
itself with instructing the jury to disregard the improper testimony. Although, an innocent statement as to liability insurance is fully as prejudicial to the defendant as a wilful statement, the distinction drawn by the courts is probably justified
by the circumstances. A plaintiff should not be required to
retry his case because of an inadvertent remark by one of his
witnesses, not responsive to the question asked.
A more strict rule is however, applied to the plaintiff and
to his counsel, as to their own statements. It is their duty to
protect the case from improper influences and a negligent failure so to do is equivalent to wilful misconduct. The New
York Court of Appeals held in Rodzborski vs. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 210 N. Y. 262, 104 N. E. 616, that it will be
assumed, where the plaintiff as a witness in his own behalf, or
other important witnesses for the plaintiff, state on the examination in chief matters tending to establish that the defendant
is insured against liability, that the plaintiff's counsel knew
that the question put would elicit such statement.
It seems unquestionably the duty of plaintiff's counsel to
instruct him upon the impropriety of statements to the effect
that defendant carries liability insurance. When counsel fails
so to do, and error occurs, it is altogether just that a new trial
be granted, as in the case of wilful misconduct. When a
claimant consults an attorney regarding his rights in a damage
case, one of the first questions put to him by the attorney con-
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cerns the insurance carried by defendant and there can be no
excuse whatever for an "unexpected" or "unresponsive"
answer by plaintiff to his attorney's questions upon the trial
of the case.
In determining whether a new trial shall be granted on
account of improper statements concerning liability insurance,
the Colorado Courts, as well as many other Courts, also apply
another test. Does it affirmatively appear that the defendant
was not prejudiced by the alleged errors? If that is the situation., of course a new trial will not be granted. The burden
to establish lack of prejudice seems to be upon the plaintiff.
In Tanner vs. Harper, 32 Colo. 156, when the jury was being
empaneled, counsel for plaintiff stated that an insurance company was the real party in interest, in defense of the suit.
Upon objection, by defendant, the Court advised the jury that
they should disregard the remark of counsel. The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment below on the ground that there
were no close questions of fact in the determination of which
the jury might have been unconsciously influenced by the consideration of extraneous and improper matter, and that it
appeared affirmatively that the defendants were not prejudiced
by the erroneous statements of counsel.
Virtually the same holding was made in Parkdale Fuel
Co., vs. Taylor, 26 C. A. 304, wherein counsel for plaintiff
asked a juror on his voir dire examination, "Do you know Mr.
Felker or Mr. Dickinson, who represents the Ocean Insurance
Company in this case?" The Court in its opinion recognized
and condemned the improper motive of plaintiff's counsel,
but, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, stated that
"it affirmatively appears from the record that the verdict was
not the result of the misconduct of counsel, but is sustained
by sufficient evidence."
Coe vs. Van Why, supra, is the only Colorado case which
has been found, containing a discussion of error of this nature
occurring after the jury has been selected and sworn. As
before stated in this paper, error occurring after the selection
of the jury seems to be considered more prejudicial and in
that case the Court held that the error was not cured by an
instruction from the court to disregard the comments of
counsel.
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In Tatarsky vs. Smith, 78 Colo. 491, the defendant
counterclaimed against plaintiff who was the insured party.
Defendant in establishing the damage to his automobile testified in answer to his attorney's question that an itemized statement for the estimated cost of repairs, furnished by an automobile company, was in the hands of the indemnity company.
The court in affirming the judgment below, which was against
the insured plaintiff, made no comment upon this alleged
error.
Attorneys for insurance companies are as a whole well
satisfied that objections to prejudicial testimony or statements
of this nature, followed by an instruction from the court that
the jury disregard such matters, works to increase rather than
to decrease, the prejudicial effect.
The Illinois Court of Appeals said in Wiersema vs. Lockwood and S. Co., 147 Ill. App. 33 that instructions make more
emphatic the evil intended to be cured, and also, that if counsel are permitted to resort to the practice of violating the law
of evidence, and then curing the violation by merely giving
an instruction to the jury to disregard the unwarranted and
illegitimate remarks, the law of evidence would be useless
and but a farce.
The comment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit in Stewart vs. Newby, 266 Fed.,
287, upon the irremovable prejudice of such evidence is
worthy of repetition;
"The only purpose for which such evidence is presented is to prejudice
the jury and the poison is of such character, that once being injected into the
mind it is difficult of eradication . . . The removal of the fly does not
restore an appetite for the food into which it has fallen."

It is therefore commonly considered that an instruction
from the Court does not cure the error. A new trial is the
only effective remedy. Defense attorneys accordingly no
longer protest every possible mention of insurance, but are
prone to keep an eye upon the apparent motive of counsel,
and if wilful misconduct is obvious, or if the violation of the
rule is inexcusable, a motion is promptly made for an order
of mistrial. In the absence of misconduct justifying an order
of mistrial, defense counsel usually prefer to accept the situation without comment.
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It should be remarked that the introduction of evidence
of insurance is not without advantage to the defendant in some
cases. When the evidence is legitimately in the case, and is
not therefore "untouchable", the defendant is able properly
to gain some support with the jury from the argument that
large jury verdicts affect the jurors themselves by increasing
the cost of insurance, and from the further argument that the
defendant, having no personal interest in the result, is without
the tendency towards falsification or exaggeration, which unavoidably attaches itself to the interested party.
The rule excluding evidence of liability insurance in
negligence cases is probably violated by attorneys more frequently and more flagrantly than any other rule of evidence
or of procedure prescribed by the Courts, and apparently
without any excuse other than that of self-interest. The Courts
have declared that attorneys have a very positive duty in
respect to this rule, and it is respectfully submitted that attorneys should join with the Courts in an earnest effort effectively to restrain inexcusable violations.

"LEGAL TITLES"
A new book, with the above title, compiled and published
by the Landon Abstract Company, of Denver, is already
proving a great convenience to attorneys, particularly to those
handling real estate matters in the four counties,-Denver,

Adams, Arapahoe and Jefferson. This book gives a complete
list of the correct legal titles of all Additions and Subdivisions
in those four counties, making a total of 2,510 titles. Because
of its accuracy, even in such matters of detail as commas and
apostrophes, this list is invaluable in drawing instruments involving legal descriptions.
Much other often-needed information, such as facts about
tax levies and lists of abstracters in the various counties, is
included in easily accessible form.

ACCELERATION CLAUSES IN NOTES
By Jesse H. Sherman of the Denver Bar
N view of the increasing number of foreclosures which are
taking place, the decision of our Supreme Court in Spears
vs. Cook, 85 Colo. 318 furnishes food for thought.
Suit was brought upon a promissory note, secured by a
trust deed. There was no acceleratin clause in the note, but
the trust deed contained a provision that in case of default
in the payment of interest, the whole principal sum might be
declared due and payable. Default was made in the payment of interest and suit was brought upon the note, before
maturity, upon the theory that the note and trust deed together constituted one contract and that the provision in the
trust deed also controlled and accelerated the time of payment of the note. The Court held that the action was premature and that the acceleration clause in the trust deed matured the debt for the purpose of foreclosure only and not for
the purpose of supporting an action upon the note.
In this decision the Court refers to the case of Parker vs.
McGinty, 77 Colo. 458. The latter case arose out of a foreclosure of a mortgage and the entry of a deficiency judgment
before the maturity of the note. In commenting upon this
case, the following language appears in Spears vs. Cook: "The
mortgage (in the Parker case) contained a provision for the
acceleration of the due date upon failure to pay interest. Such
failure occurred and the principal was declared due and payable. A foreclosure was decreed and a deficiency entered in
the foreclosure suit against the defendants personally liable
for the debt. This was in accordance with Section 272 of the
Code. The Court then added: "If Parker and Wagner had
been sued on the note independently of a foreclosure proceeding, the action would have been premature, so far as the
principal debt is concerned. For the purpose of such an
action the acceleration provision would not have made the
principal due and payable".
From the foregoing it would appear that(a) If suit is brought to foreclose under an acceleration
clause in a mortgage or trust deed, a deficiency judgment can
be entered on a-note not due;
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(b)
If foreclosure takes place through the Public
Trustee under an acceleration clause in a trust deed) no suit
for deficiency can be brought upon the note before maturity,
unless there is also an acceleration clause in the note.
As a matter of fact the note sued on in the Parker vs.
McGinty case also contained ani acceleration clause, which
the Court must have overlooked when it said, in the SpearsCook case, that "If Parker and Wagner had been sued on the
note independently of a foreclosure proceeding, the action
would have been premature so far as the principal indebtedness is concerned."

BELIEVE IT OR NOT
State of Colorado
o
County of Boulder ss:

Before R. W. Morgan, Esq.,
Justice of the Peace.

The People of the State of Colorado
versus
F. E. Goehring

CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT

The Complaint of Chas. Rotolo made before R. W.
Morgan, Esq., a Justice of the Peace in and for said County,
on the 6th day of October, A. D. 1930, who, being duly sworn,
upon his oath says: That F. E. Goehring on or about the 5th
day of October, A. D. 1930, at, to-wit, the said County of
Boulder, in the State aforesaid, Did then and there Violate
the Motor, Traffic Laws of the State of Colorado. by driving
in a reckless and abandon manner thereby injuring the property and damaging the person of one Chas. Rotolo to the
extent of breaking the leg of one of his valuable milk cows
thereby causing him great financial loss, contrary to the form
of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the same People of the State of Colorado.
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 6th day of October, A. D. 19 ..........
R. W. Morgan,
Justice of the Peace.

CHAS. ROTOLO.

(
)

DICTAPHUN
OUR BOVINE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
IS UNEXCELLED
You will recall that in 8 Dicta (4) 24, and 8 Dicta (5) 22, we took
occasion to refer to Chief Justice Adams' bold stand that milk is a natural
product.

See Climax Dairy Co. v. Mulder, 78 Colo. 407, 414.

Well, sir,

by looking under the heading "Cow" (we said cow) in Words and Phrases,
next series, we found:
(a) That "Cows do not give formaldehyde." People v. Bowen, 182
N.Y. 1, 8.
(b) That the Georgia Court of Appeals, after mature deliberation,
was forced to conclude that "the word 'cow' does denote the sex of the animal."

Gibson v. State, 67 S. E. 838, 839.

(c) That in Commonwealth v. Haynes, 107 Mass. 194, a gent with
the unhappily appropriate name of Aquarius Breen was found guilty of
adulterating milk with water.
And (d) that, all the foregoing authorities to the contrary, in fact flinging them down and dancing on them, an Ohio circuit court "took judicial
notice that one can never tell what an old cow will do." Marsh v. Koons,
78 Ohio St. 68, 69.

THE LATE MR. YORICK, WE KNEW HIM
"A widow who abandons her husband without cause, thereby loses her
right to the homestead." Syllabus 1 to Sears v. Sears, 45 Texas 557.

POLITICIANS CAN KEEP BOTH EARS
TO THE GROUND
"Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the defendant to
watch his rear was gross negligence." Kansas City Co. v. Cook, 66 Fed.
115, 123.

16TH AND LINCOLN. RING TWICE AND
ASK FOR TONY
"We are not disposed to consider him (a Chicago detective) unworthy
of belief, because he was employed by good people to aid them in checking
the evils of gambling and prize-fighting among the members of the Young
Men's Christian Association." Burn v. People, 45 Ill. App. 70, 71.
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OH, YEAH?
"The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted to us a large
volume of 361 pages which is called a brief. It is not a brief, and does not
serve the purpose of elucidating and aiding which is done by a brief. It
has an index of twelve pages, which is about the length the brief would have
been if made after the way established for the making of briefs." Rudiger
v. Coleman, 114 N. Y. S. 689.

REFRESHING JUDICIAL STYLE IN THE
QUONDAM CONFEDERACY
"The 'God-damn-it-Johnie-go-ahead-anyhow' style of attention to the
non-delegable duty of the master to supply to employees safe machinery and
appliances can meet at the hands of this court nothing short of the sternest
condemnation." Southern Co. v. Wiley, 88 Miss. 825, 841.

NOT TALKING ABOUT US, WERE YOU, GEORGE?
"There is no reason why a man should not be a fool."
Jessel, M. R., in Bennet v,. Bennet, 43 L. T.

Sir George

(N. S.) 246.

FINAL WARNING
The Supreme Court is likely to hand down a decision any Monday.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIr's NOm.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

BANKS-ULTRA VIREs-RATIFICATION-No. 12421-The Illi-

nois Building Company v. The GuardianTrust CompanyDecided Feb. 2, 1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff sued defendant to recover the amount
claimed to be due under a lease entered into between plaintiff's predecessors and defendant's assignor. The District
Court held that the defendant was not liable because the acts
of the officers were ultra vires and that the defendant was not
estopped to deny liability.
Held.-1. While a bank generally may not engage in
commercial enterprises, still for the purpose of protecting its
loans it undoubtedly has such right.
2. While the contract entered into with reference to the
lease was ultra vires, the defendant was estopped to assert such
ultra vires because the plaintiff had fully performed and the
defendant had accepted the benefits of the contract.
Judgment reversed.
ATTORNEYS-UNPROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT-DISCIPLINE-NO.

12780-People v.
. Decided Feb. 2, 1931.
Facts.-Committee on grievances of Colorado Bar Association made its report finding respondent guilty:
1. Of altering a check in striking out the words "in full
payment of all claims to date".
2. Of taking forcible possession of certain building instead of resorting to the orderly process of the laws for obtaining possession.
3. Recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded.
Held.-1. No lawyer can make, destroy, and alter evidence irrespective of whether such conduct constitutes crime
and maintain his standing at the Bar.
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2. No lawyer can ignore available legal remedies and
resort to arms nor appeal thereto from the Courts, and maintain his standing at this Bar.
3. In view of the fact that respondent was a man of education and character, and had practiced law in this State for
more than thirty years and held many important offices during
that period and his professional reputation hitherto was without blemish, it was ordered that the reprimand be administered before the Court in chambers and not in public. And
it was so done.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-POWER OF ATTORNEY

GENERAL-

PROSECUTION BY STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY-NO.

12479-

Colorado State Board of Pharmacy v. Hallett-Decided
February 9, 1931.
Facts.-This was an action by State Board of Pharmacy
against defendant Hallett, an unlicensed druggist, to recover
penalty for selling poisons. Prosecution below was by District Attorney. Defendant sought to quash complaint on
ground that civil action for penalty could only be brought
by attorney general and that legislative act which empowered
District Attorney to bring action was unconstitutional. Lower
Court held act unconstitutional and dismissed the action.
Held.-It was competent for general assembly by legislative act to repeal or abrogate any part of the common law.
Therefore, although the attorney general, at common law,
would be the only proper state officer who could maintain the
suit, yet the legislature had the power to place the authority
to bring such action in the District Attorney or special counsel.
Judgment reversed.
UTILITIES COMMISSION-No. 12562People vs. Swena-Decided February 9, 1931.
Facts.-The Public Utilities Commission sued Swena to
recover the amount of a fine imposed by it in a contempt proceeding. It was alleged that Swena was operating a motor
vehicle carrier without having obtained a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and ordered him to desist and upon
his failure to do so, the commission fined him $200.00 for such
contempt. Trial Court dismissed the case.
CONTEMPT-PUBLIC
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Held.-The power to punish for contempt is a judicial
power, not within the province of the commission. It belongs
exclusively to the Courts, except in cases where the constitution confers such power upon some other body. Section 2975
C. L. Attempting to confer upon the Commission the power
to punish for contempt is unconstitutional and therefore void.
Judgment affirmed.
CONVERSION-INNOCENT

POSSESSION

OF

CHATTELS--No.

12465-Lutz v. Becker-Decided February 9,1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff in error was defendant below and defendant in error, plaintiff. Plaintiff commenced action in
conversion, claiming to be owner of certain chattels in the
possession of defendant, which were commingled with certain
chattels owned by defendant. Defendant did not claim title
to plaintiff chattels and requested plaintiff to identify her
property and remove it. Judgment for plaintiff.
Held.-The defendant did not exercise any distinct unauthorized act of dominion over personal property belonging
to plaintiff. Neither the taking was wrongful nor did the
possession amount to wrongful dominion. Conversion would
not lie.
Judgment reversed.
INSURANCE-WAR RISK-FEDERAL ACT-BENEFICIARY-No.

12328-Estate of Patrick J. McQuade, deceased, et al. vs.
Anderson-DecidedFebruary 9, 1931.
Facts.-Writ of error prosecuted to review decree of
heirship of District Court affirming a similar decree of County court, awarding insurance proceeds of federal War Risk
Insurance policy to widow of beneficiary under policy, she
being the sole and only heir at law of the beneficiary. Proceeds were also claimed by uncle of deceased insured upon
ground that proceeds must be distributed under the federal
statutes to the heirs of the deceased soldier within a certain
permitted class, which included uncle, but excluded widow of
beneficiary.
Held.-That upon death of insured, under Section 303
of Act of March 4, 1925, the balance due under the policy was
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payable to the estate of the insured and his father being the
sole heir at law of this intestate son, who was the insured, that
the father's estate was entitled thereto; that his widow, being
his sole and only heir at law, is entitled to the balance of the
insurance.
Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-LIFE-WAIVER OF NON-PAYMENT OF PREMIUM

-No. 12615-The Reliance Life Insurance Co. vs. Wiolverton-Decided February 16, 1931.
Facts.-Defendantin error, who was plaintiff below sued
defendant life insurance Company upon a life insurance
policy issued to her deceased husband in which she was beneficiary. Defendant resisted payment on ground that an insurance premium was not paid when due nor within the period
of grace allowed. Plaintiff relied on fact that even though
not paid when due nor within period of grace thereafter that
defendant had accepted and retained same and waived payment when due. Above issues submitted to jury which found
for plaintiff.
Held.-(1) A condition in an insurance policy that it
shall be void if premiums are not paid when due may be
waived.
(2) After the receipt and unconditional acceptance of
the money it is too late to declare a forfeiture.
(3) Forfeitures are not favored and courts should be
liberal in construing the transaction in favor of avoiding a
forfeiture.
Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING-DEMURRER-BILL OF INTERPLEADER-No.

12709

-Mason, et al. v. LeClair Mines Co.-Decided February
24, 1931.
Facts.-LeClair Mines Company, the lessor, filed a complaint below in the nature of an original bill of an interpleader
alleging that it held in its hands certain funds, which were
claimed by lessees and sub-lessees in the mines, disclaiming
any interest therein in lessor. Lessee filed a combination demurrer and answer. The demurrer was overruled, and the
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lessee elected to stand on the demurrer. The Court below
entered final judgment against lessee and held that the lessees
were without right to participate in the fund.
Held.-I. The bill of complaint sets forth sufficient
grounds requiring the respondents to interplead.
2. The Court below erred in holding that because the
lessees elected to stand on the demurrer that they were denied
the right to participate in the fund in dispute.
3. The records of the Court below not properly certified
by the Clerk of the District Court will be disregarded.
Judgment reversed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSOLIDATION OF COUNTY AND

12376-Lail, et
al. vs. City and County of Denver-Decided February 24,
1931.
Facts.-Lailand others sought the reversal of a judgment
rendered against them in an action on a bond brought by the
City and County of Denver. Lail, at a time when he was
Clerk and Recorder and Ex-Officio Clerk of the City and
County of Denver, was appointed by the mayor, Public
Trustee of the City and County of Denver, and continued for
a time to exercise the duties of both offices. He received in
full his salary as Clerk and Recorder and Ex-Officio Clerk,
and retained a certain sum out of the moneys received by him
as Public Trustee, claiming it was compensation for his
services as such Public Trustee. Judgment below was against
Lail.
Held.-Under Article XX of the State Constitution and
the Charter of the City and County of Denver, there exists in
the City and County of Denver a separate and distinct office
of Public Trustee and the statutory salary of $5,000.00 per
annum is applicable thereto, but under the charter provisions
Lail was not entitled to receive any salary as Public Trustee
in addition to his salary as Clerk and Recorder and Ex-Officio
Clerk of the City and County of Denver.
Judgment affirmed.
CITY OFFICERS--DOUBLE SALARIES--No.
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WAR RISK INSURANCE-POWER To DISPOSE OF BY WILL-No.

12781-In the matter of the Estate of Jones, deceased v.
Wright, et al.-Decided February 24, 1931.
Facts.-Residuary legatee in the will of deceased soldier
seeks review of judgment of the District Court which awarded
funds due under a Federal War Risk Insurance policy issued
to deceased to personal representatives of deceased's beneficiary, who was his mother, and was also legatee of the Insurance under his will. Judgment below for personal represen-tatives of deceased's beneficiary.
Held.-The insured soldier died testate, his mother being
the beneficiary in the policy and also the legatee under the
will, and she was left, him surviving. The balance of insurance in his estate must be paid out pursuant to the provisions
of his will. The intention of the testator, as expressed in his
will, was that his mother was to receive his U. S. Government
War Risk Insurance Policy. Upon her death her personal
representatives were entitled to the fund and not the residuary
legatee.
Judgment affirmed.

SCHOOL LANDS -

MINERAL RIGHTS -

RESERVATIONS -

No.

12671-Miller, et al. v. The Limon National Bank-Decided February 24, 1931.
Facts.-The Bank was plaintiff below and brought this
action under our Declaratory Judgment Act seeking a judicial
determination of the duty of the State Board of Land Commissioners to draw a voucher in favor of the Bank for the
return of money paid by it by mistake on an invalid certificate of purchase of State Lands. Judgment below for
the Bank. The land was sold by the State, reserving mineral
rights. Payments were defaulted and contract to purchase
cancelled. The action was to recover back the money paid on
the ground of mistake in that the reservation of the minerals
was void.
Held.-I. The State Land Board was without authority
to sell less than the fee title.
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2. The validating act of the State Legislature of April
19, 1917, and of March 31, 1919, validated such certificates
and was a ratification by the State of an unauthorized act.
3. Payments on the contract having been made subsequent to the decision in Gunter v. Walpole, 65 Colo. 234, and
since the purchaser took no action of any kind indicating the
withdrawal of his assent to the contract until long after they
were validated, the contract stands as though fully authorized
when made, and the cancellation and forfeiture of payments
thereunder are in all respects as valid as if these sales had
originally been sales of the fee.
Judgment reversed.
STATE LANDS-RESERVATION IN

DEED--No. 12417-Driscoll,

et al. v. The State of Colorado, et al.-Decided March 2,
1931.
Facts.-The State Land Board sold State land to the
Driscolls, reserving mineral rights, and thereafter gave the
Texas Production Company an oil and gas lease on the reserved estate. The Board and the Texas Production Company brought the action in the Court below to enjoin the Driscoils from interfering with the reserved estate and the rights
of the lessee. By answer and Cross-complaint the Driscolls
claimed title in fee simple and demanded that the same be
quieted in them. Demurrers were sustained to the answer,
and the Driscolls elected to stand on their pleadings and prosecute this writ.
Held.-The notice of sale and certificate of purchase each
contained the mineral reservation. At the time of the sale, the
State Land Board had authority to sell and convey the fee
title to the land in question, but nothing less. Hence the sale
was invalid, but in 1917 and 1919 the General Assembly validated prior unauthorized sales of surface rights only of state
lands. These validating acts were lawful. In this case the
sale of surface rights only was in all respects as valid and binding as if duly authorized by statute when made in the first
instance.
Judgment affirmed.
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12548-People v.
Hillyer-Decided March 9, 1931.
Facts.-Petition was filed by Attorney General against
respondent that he be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
Referee found three charges sustained by the evidence.
Held.-1. The respondent misappropriated money collected by him for a client.
2. The respondent grossly neglected his duty as an attorney for a client in an action against a railroad company for
damages for personal injuries.
3. The respondent converted to his own use, money entrusted to him by a client for the purpose of redeeming certain
mining properties from tax sales.
Respondent disbarred.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW-DISBARMENT-NO.

MONEY

HAD

AND

RECEIVED -

BANKRUPTCY -

CHATTEL

MORTGAGES-NO. 12290-Johnson v. The National Sugar

Mfg. Co. et al.-Decided March 30, 1931.
Facts.-Johnson, plaintiff below, brought action on
grounds of money had and received against the National
Sugar Mfg. Co. One, Rife, gave chattel mortgage on his beet
crop to said sugar company. Subsequently, he gave a junior
chattel mortgage on same crop to Johnson. After crop was
delivered to sugar company, Johnson demanded that sugar
company pay his junior mortgage out of proceeds, after first
deducting senior mortgage owing to sugar company. Subsequently, Rife filed petition in bankruptcy, was adjudicated a
bankrupt and a trustee appointed and by intervention the
trustee in bankruptcy became a party to this action. The sugar
company, on order of referee in bankruptcy, paid the proceeds
of crop to the referee instead of to the plaintiff. Judgment
for sugar company below.
Held.-1. Sugar company, after demand by plaintiff,
made payment to referee at its peril.
2. Junior mortgagee is entitled to any part of the proceeds remaining after satisfying prior encumbrances.

DICTA

3. The complaint herein is one in assumpsit for money
had and received, and it is not in conversion.
4. Where one has in his hands funds which in equity
and good conscience belong to another, the law creates a
promise to pay said funds to the owner, and action in assumpsit for money had and received is a proper action to enforce
payment.
5. Where plaintiff below withdrew his preferred claim
filed in bankruptcy, the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing this action.
Judgment reversed.
STENOGRAPHIC POSITION WANTED
Expert stenographer with over ten years' experience desires
position in law office.
Call MISS SELENA H. COCKAYNE
909 E. I Ith Ave., FRanklin 0405
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